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The Last or the Lost American Ambassador?
Slaven Letica
Warren Zimmermann's article "The Last
Ambassador," sub-titled "A Memoir of the Collapse of
Yugoslavia", published in Foreign Affairs, Volume 74, No.
2, is a remarkably interesting account written by a man
with an undeniable literary talent. At the same time, it is
an important historical document because it was not
written by just any casual voyeur of Balkan post -communist
democratic revolutions and wars, such as a journalist or a
scientist, for instance, but one of the few foreign diplomats
who had a hand in creating history, and had a real
opportunity to change its course, because he was the last
American ambassador to Yugoslavia, from 1989 to 1992.
Since I myself played a similar - although not so
important - role of witness and participant in the events
described by the former US Ambassador in his story (I
was the personal advisor of the Croatian President from
April 1990 to March 1991), it seems logical for me to write
my story from a different, Croatian perspective.
It must be said from the outset that Zimmermann's
"Memoir" is a typically American view of the
disintegration of Yugoslavia and the causes of the conflict,
but it is also an interesting account of his experiences with
the key protagonists in this tragic history. The "American"
aspect of the story is patent insofar as the author assesses
Balkan vicissitudes through the lens of what Robert N.
Bellah calls the (American) "Habits of the Heart"! or
"Civil Religion:", and what has been called the "American
Social Character" by some other authors. In practice, this
means that Warren Zimmermann observes all processes,
people and events in the former Yugoslavia through the
lens of a political "religion" which deeply believes in the
individual, the federalism, the rule of law, liberal
democracy and cultural tolerance, and sincerely despises
any form of racism, xenophobia, nationalism,
authoritarianism or "Balkanisation."
This is why Zimmermann's "memoir" is a kind of
"American mirror", or "the West Side Story" of the
Croatian, Slovenian, Bosnian and Serb consciousness and
reality in the period between 1989 and 1992.
All the key figures in that reality - Slobodan Milosevic,
Vuk Draskovic, Franjo Tudrnan, Radovan Karadzic,
Vojislav Seselj, Alija Izetbegovic, Kiro Gligorov, Ante
Markovic and the author himself - were known personally
to Zimmermann, who gained, as he believed, an almost
psychoanalytical insight into their social-psychological
being.
The American ''Yugoslav - dream"
For the US Ambassador, love is the justification for
his outspoken and sincere account - sometimes not very
considerate of the protagonists' feelings - of the leaders,
peoples and events that have been rocking Europe and
the world for five years. At the beginning of his article, he
says of Lawrence Eagleburger and himself that they
"shared a love of the country (Yugoslavia, S.L.) and its
people" (page 2). As far as his love of Yugoslavia and the
"Yugoslav people" is concerned, I can confirm the
following: everyone who has met and known him- can
testify that his love for the people and sights of the former
Yugoslavia was deep and sincere.
Unfortunately, Warren Zimmermann's real - but
blind and platonic - love for "Yugoslavia" and the
"Yugoslavs" was not just limited to natural beauty and
people, but also embraced the state and the political
system, which Zimmermann believed to be worthy not
only of his personal love, but also of the love of the United
States. He obviously thought that for Tito's Yugoslavia,
which he knew well, to be worthy of all-embracing (i.e.
Serb, Croat, Slovenian, American, Albanian etc.) love, it
only needed true westernisation or Americanisation, i.e.
democracy, true federalism, true protection of human
rights, and a true market economy.
I would like here to repeat his words: "a (second)
major mistake."
In the early 1990s, and in 1995, Warren Zimmermann
saw the vision and reality of such a federalist, multicultural,
democratic and market-oriented Yugoslavia only in the
personality and reformist project of Ante Markovic. In
his story, Ante Markovic is the only positive, albeit naive
and tragic, figure.
In general, it can be said that the key to understanding
all Zimmermann's sound judgments, as well as his
preconceived ideas, errors and mistaken views (and wrong
decisions) regarding the events and people in the former
Yugoslavia, is to be found in his attitude to nationalism:
"Nationalism is by nature uncivil, antidemocratic and
separatist because it empowers one ethnic group over all
others". (page 7)
With a deeply ingrained imperative of the American
"civil religion", discussed above, which is only aware of
separatist nationalism (and which attaches an a priori
negative meaning to the very notion of confederalism, let
alone secession), Warren Zimmermann could not
understand, and still does not seem to understand, the
essence of Greater Serbian post-Communist nationalism.
This nationalism is basically "federalist" and "anti-
separatist", i.e. its goal is either absolute national
domination (based on the dogma of the superiority of the
Serb people) or military conquest.
Zimmermann's culturally imposed or learned
inability to grasp the expansionist, imperialist and criminal
nature of Greater Serbian nationalism (which logically led
to concentration camps, ritual and mass murder, rape and
the destruction of all material signs of the historical
presence of non-Serb populations in the conquered
territories) affects his judgment throughout the article.
Since he is not aware of, and does not recognise,
"federalist" (i.e. "expansionist") nationalism,
Zimmermann does not see Slobodan Milosevic as a
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nationalist: "Milosevic is an opportunist, not an ideologue,
a man driven by power rather than nationalism" (page 5,
the bold characters are my own).
The reduction of nationalism to separatism, and the
overlooking of the fatal fact that in the case of Milosevic
we are faced with the worst form of militant national-
socialism, are both present throughout the text.
Comparing the Serbian and Croatian presidents,
Zimmermann says: "Unlike Milosevic, who is driven by
power, Tudrnan is obsessed by nationalism" (page 7)
In general terms, Zimmermann sees no nationalism
in Serbia, but only "Milosevic's aggressive tactics" (page
8). While seeing various forms of "naked nationalism" in
Slovenia and Croatia, in Serbia he sees only a form of
power politics.
Zimmermann calls Siovenian nationalism "Garbo
nationalism" and describes it in the following words: " ...
they just wanted to be left alone. Their vice was selfishness.
In their drive to separate from Yugoslavia they simply
ignored the 22 million Yugoslavs who were not Slovenes.
They bear considerable responsibility for the bloodbath
that followed their secession (page 7)."
There is no doubt that he saw the position and role
of the Slovenes and Slovenia through the prism of the
American Civil War, in which the separatist South (in this
case the secessionist north-west) was cast as the bad guy.
However, Croatian nationalism is definitely the worst
kind of nationalism in his story: " ... Croatian nationalism
is defined by Tudman - intolerant, anti-Serb, and
authoritarian. These attributes - together with an aura of
wartime fascism, help to explain why many Serbs in
Croatia reject Croatian rule, and why the core hostility in
the former Yugoslavia is still between Serbs and Croats"
(page 8). Only pages later does he generously concede:
"Albanian nationalism was, like Croatian nationalism, to
some degree a reaction to Milosevic's aggressive tactics"
(page 8).
"Serbian nationalism" as a phrase appears only once
in his article: ("During 1990, Serbian nationalism under
Milosevic became even more aggressive" - page 8), and it
is quite obvious that Zimmermann is unaware of it as a
cultural and political phenomenon in its own right. There
are only individual Serb leaders who may be fanatical,
extreme and monstrous nationalists. Some of them are
"fanatic nationalists like Vojislav Seselj" (page 12), others,
such as Vuk Draskovic, are "pro-Serbian extremists", yet
others, like Radovan Karadzic, are "monsters" - but
"Serbian nationalism" does not exist as a collective evil.
In Zimmermann's consciousness, it cannot exist, because
he knows and recognises only separatist nationalism.
All Zimmermann's views on the key protagonists of
these events stem from his utterly negative attitude to any
form of separatist nationalism, and his benevolent attitude
towards "federalist" nationalism (in Slav languages, this
form of nationalism is encompassed by the notion of
"unitarism", which has very negative connotations), even
when it is based on a racist and militarist ideology of the
all-Serbs-in-one-state type, and on the method of genocide
called "ethnic cleansing".
Thus, Radovan Karadzic and Ante Markovic are seen
as representing opposite poles, Karadzic as the epitome
of the bad guy, and Markovic as his antipode, with all other
figures situated somewhere in between.
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The Bad Guy Radovan Karadiic
The position and labels attributed to Radovan
Karadzic correspond to his true demonic nature and to
the crimes he has ordered or tacitly condoned, but they
also reflect the author's system of values. For
Zimmermann, Radovan Karadzic is both a war criminal
and a "separatist nationalist" aspiring to break up Bosnia-
Herzegovina, which is seen by Zimmermann as the
embodiment of the ideal state: federalist, democratic,
multicultural etc.
Here is how Zimmermann describes Karadzic: "He
was the architect of massacres in the Muslim villages,
ethnic cleansing, and artillery attacks on civilian
populations. In his fanaticism, ruthlessness, and contempt
for human values, he invites comparison with a monster
from another generation, Heinrich Himmler" (page 18).
Although the metaphor "architect of massacres" is
questionable - since the concepts of ethnic cleansing and
territorial conquest had already been established in Serbia,
and thus Karadzic can only be called the high priest and
practitioner of massacres, not its architect, since that name
would imply that he was the intellectual begetter of the
idea of such evil (that he worked out the technique and
timing of the crimes, and probably ordered them to be
committed) - all his other judgments on Karadzic are quite
sound. The following descriptions and opinions are also
valid: "his disdain for the truth was absolute" and "his
apartheid philosophy was as extreme as anything
concocted in South Africa" (page 18).
The Good Guy Ante Markovic
On the other hand, the author presents Ante
Markovic as the absolute opposite to the demonic nature
of Radovan Karadzic. In a way, Markovic is the ideal (but
quite unrealistic) expression of the American "Yugoslav
dream," which is based on the belief in human rights,
democracy, federalism and the "melting pot of nations".
Describing Ante Markovic, Zimmermann describes
and justifies both himself and the American policy, which,
even after the destruction of Vukovar and the attack on
Dubrovnik, believed in the last Yugoslav Prime Minister:
"Markovic still departed as a symbol of everything his
country needed: a modern, stable economy, the rule of
law, ethnic tolerance. He had treated Yugoslavia like a
patient with a serious cancer - nationalism. A semi-heroic,
semi-tragic figure, Markovic failed, but at least he had
fought the cancer instead of adjusting to it. He had aspired
to be Yugoslavia's saviour. Instead, he turned out to be
the Yugoslavian equivalent of Russia's last leader before
the Bolshevik deluge, Aleksandar Kerensky" (page 17).
The literary form "he had fought the cancer instead of
adjusting to it" unerringly suggests that in the eyes of the
last ambassador, Markovic is some kind of mythical, i.e.
unquestionably tragic, hero (who is aware of the futility
of his tragic sacrifice, but consciously chooses his fate).
Unfortunately, Ante Markovic is, like Warren
Zimmermann himself, more of a loser (it is my opinion
that he deeply believed he would win in the polls in Bosnia
and ultimately defeat Siobodan Milosevic, Milan Kucan
and Franjo Tudrnan).
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By describing Ante Markovic as a tragic figure,
Warren Zimmermann shows a sad ignorance of the
personality of the last Yugoslav Prime Minister but also
his ignorance of tragedy as an art form.
According to the ancient Greeks, tragedy is a lofty
form of drama in which the fate of the chief protagonist is
always determined in advance. In a series of tragedies,
history has cast Ante Markovic in a marginal and farcical
role. His "dramatic" scenario for the building of a "new
kind of socialism" was halfway between a historic farce
and a provincial comedy: while the JNA was concocting
plans for a military coup and the scenario for the salvation
of communism, he was planning to set up a reformist party.
Of course, he had had his chance to change his role into a
semi-heroic, semi-tragic one. If he had stood before the
tanks setting out to destroy Vukovar and said something
along the lines of: "Take or kill me, but let this wonderful
town and its inhabitants live in peace - they have not done
anything wrong!" Ante Markovic would have earned the
description of hero or tragic figure. There is no doubt that
Aeschylus and Shakespeare would have written such a role
for him before bestowing on him the aura of tragic figure
or hero.
The Message to Belgrade
Instead, he sat on quietly in Belgrade until the last
moment, when nobody, as Zimmermann himself says,
even noticed his "protest" resignation. After this, he settled
in Vienna, probably convinced that his project was too
noble for the barbarians living south-east of that city. Thus,
Ante Markovic was not, and could not be, even a semi-
hero or a semi-tragic figure because he was by nature an
opportunist, bureaucrat and careerist, who in his pre-
Zimmermann career played the role of a Communist
"aparatchik", and in the Zimmermann period switched to
the role of an opportunistic "dernocratchik." Instead of
taking on the role of "divider" of Yugoslavia himself
(brilliantly played by Vaclav Havel a few years later), he
took on the role of "tragic" saviour, thrust upon him by
the US Administration (including Warren Zimmermann).
To use Zimmermann's metaphor, we could say that this
was an example of "Garbo federalism" and that, as far as
responsibility was concerned, Markovic himself and the
US Administration represented by Warren Zimmermann
"bore considerable responsibility for the bloodbath that
followed Markovic's reformism."
Instead of a strategy of gradual delegitimization of
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ),
which could have begun in the autumn of 1990 the
chimeras of "reformism" and "federalism" were
encouraged, which enabled the JNA and Serbia to prepare
for aggression undisturbed. The moment the aggression
began, the US Administration introduced an additional
means of punishing the victims by imposing an arms
embargo.
Warren Zimmermann's article clearly reveals how
the Bush Administration's policy, mediated and/or
suggested by the ambassador himself, was wrong from the
beginning.
The honesty with which the lost ambassador
rationalises what is arguably the biggest foreign policy and
diplomatic mistake committed by the US State
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Department this century is especially interesting:
"Eagleburger and I agreed that in my introductory calls
in Belgrade and the capitals of the republics, I would
deliver a new message: Yugoslavia no longer enjoyed the
geopolitical importance that the United States had given
it during the Cold War." (page 2).
The Yugoslavia to which Zimmermann refers is not
so much a State as a corridor, a geopolitical corridor. And
this is where the error lies: Even though the fall of
Communism and the creation of democratic and free-
market institutions were the most important strategic
interests of the US and Western civilisation, on the brink
of a possible "democratic revolution" in the Balkans,
Zimmermann openly proclaimed that this corridor no
longer had any geopolitical interest for the United States.
In terms of the power relations in the 'former Yugoslavia,
Slobodan Milosevic and the leadership of the JNA
understood this message in only one way: You can do
whatever you want!
The oft-quoted message delivered by James Baker
in Belgrade on June 21 1991 was "read" in a similar way.
Warren Zimmermann views Baker's statement in a
very positive light: "Listening to Baker deal with these
complex and irascible personalities, I felt that I had rarely,
if ever, heard a Secretary of State make a more skillful or
reasonable presentation" (page 11).
For everybody who lived in the former Yugoslavia
with the awareness that the JNA was fully prepared to
attack Slovenia and Croatia, James Baker's words that he
supported the unity of Yugoslavia, and that only the
reformist Ante Markovic had the backing of the US
Administration, were taken as a go-ahead to the JNA to
attack Slovenia.
The lay psychological descriptions of other key
protagonists of this tragedy, which Zimmermann offers
his reader, include many lucid observations, but also some
quite superficial and wrong impressions.
President Franjo Tudman
To illustrate my meaning I will confine myself to the
Croatian President Franjo Tudman. One of
Zimmermann's descriptions of the Croatian president is
the following: "If Milosevic recalls a slick con man,
Tudman resembles an inflexible schoolteacher. He is a
former general and communist, expelled from the party
under Tito, and twice jailed for nationalism" (page 7).
An author interested in the facts and truth would not
have accepted so easily the stereotype that Tudrnan was
"twice jailed for nationalism" - he would at least specify
when, and what offence he had been convicted of.
The Croatian president was convicted the first time
because he publicised the results of his research on the
number of World War II victims in Croatia (his figures
were several times lower than the official statistics of the
communist regime) and the second time because of an
interview given to a foreign reporter. If he had specified
these facts, Warren Zimmermann could have freely
expressed his opinion that the papers in question
advocated, for instance, revisionist, nationalist or any other
values or political judgments.
To say merely that Tudrnan had been "twice jailed
for nationalism" is to accept the communist, totalitarian
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view of human rights, which banned the freedom of the
press and all forms of expression guaranteed under the
constitutions of democratic nations - including the First
Amendment!
When listing the possible faults of the President of
Croatia, an objective analyst would have mentioned at
least some of his virtues: (1) he is the only active anti-
fascist combatant among all post-communist statesmen;
(2) he is one of the few scholars or Ph.D.s among post-
communist leaders (he has written about a dozen bookst):
(3) he was a dissident during the communist regime, a
political prisoner and outcast, a citizen who had been
deprived of'almost every human right for twenty years
(along with his family) because of his theoretical and
political convictions and (4) President Tudrnan is the head
of a state which was. and still is, a victim of pan-Serbian
aggression, the leader of a nation which has been, with
the consent of "the free world," disarmed and deprived
of its right to self-defence.
In his long political life, the Croatian President has
been a Communist and an anti-Communist, an
internationalist and a nationalist, an atheist and a believer,
both a great admirer and an opponent of Belgrade, an
elitist and a populist.
During World War II, the Tudrnan family was, like
the majority of the Croatian people, tragically divided by
ideology and party affiliation. The only common family
feature was anti-fascism. Everything else conspired to
disunite the family. The parents of Dr. Franjo Tudman
were members of the Croatian Farmers' Party, that is,
peace-oriented, but also nationally and religiously
conscious, with a more or less pronounced anti-communist
bias (however, during the war his father joined the
Communist Party). The three sons of the Tudman family
joined the anti-fascist partisan movement, but they were
also dyed-in-the-wool Communists, atheists and idealists,
passionately believing in Yugoslavia and the revolution.
The president's younger brother, Stjepan was killed
fighting against the Ustasha.
The divisions in the Tudman family, the divided
identity (and loyalty) between "Yugoslavhood" and
"Croathood" are typical for the majority of Croatian
people.
Croatian and Serbian "YugosJavhood"
In general terms, one can say that the Croatian and
Serbian views of "Yugoslavhood" had been fundamentally
different from the very beginning, that is, since the
integration of the two states: For the Croatian people,
who had lived in a subordinate position in complex,
multicultural unions (the Hungarian and Austro-
Hungarian Empires) without the right to their own
(national) state and national identity, "Yugoslavhood" was
a symbol of freedom, equality, and their aspirations to a
state of their own (all Croatian myths are dominated by
the idea of powerful Croatian states and kingdoms during
the early Middle Ages). Escaping from one developed
complex state (the Austro-Hungarian Empire) which was,
by its name and political order, a negation of Croatian
national identity and statehood, the Croats did not just
want any Yugoslavia, but had a definite idea of the kind
of Yugoslavia they wanted. They wanted a federal state
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of the Southern Slavs, which would recognise the national
identities and statehoods of its federal states, and which
would be based on the rule of law, democracy, pluralism,
multiculturalism and federalism. Such a federal and
multicultural "Yugoslavhood", which contains some
elements of American federalism, but also certain
elements of the Swiss confederal model, is a home-grown
Croatian intellectual and political ideal. All, or nearly all,
political projects and programs, as well as the mythologies
and ideology of federal and democratic "Yugoslavhood"
were created by Croats: Fran Supilo and Stjepan Radic
created the political philosophy of Southern Slav
federalism (which was the reason why Radic was
treacherously and perfidiously assassinated in the
"federal" Parliament in Belgrade in 1928); Josip Juraj
Strossmayer preached and practiced the ideas of Southern
Slav religious tolerance and ecumenism; the sculptor Ivan
Mestr ovic transformed his "Yugoslavhood" into
sculptures, statues and mausoleums ordered by
Aleksandar Karadordevic; Vladimir Dvo mikovic
discussed the philosophical and psychological implications
of the so-called character of Yugoslavhood, and Miroslav
Krleza did the same work in the field of encyclopaedias.
Even Communist "Yugoslavhood" was the work of Josip
BrozTito, a Croat. Even if this "Yugoslavhood" had many
primitive and undemocratic traits, it retained some
elements of (con)federalism, such as upholding the
statehood of the republics that made up ex-Yugoslavia.
While the Croatian idea of "Yugoslav hood" is based
on the "right to difference", the Serbian concept is based
on a negation of differences in language, culture, religion,
classes and interests. Cross-cultural differences in the
understanding of the "brotherhood and unity" tenet are
the easiest to examine in the ostracism of so-called
nationalism in the periods of monarchical and Communist
Yugoslavia. Thousands of Croats were brought to trial
for singing the Croatian national anthem or certain folk
songs, hoisting the Croatian flag, saying the name of the
Croatian viceroy Josip Jelacic, using certain Croatian
words and phrases which were labelled as "nationalist,"
or for merely stating their Croatian national affiliation in
a public place. The statistics of political criminal trials and
verdicts in the period between 1970 and 1990 show that
over 70% of the convicts were Croats.
The Serbian idea and political model of
"Yugoslavhood", diametrically opposed to its Slovenian
and Croatian counterparts - which the National-Socialist
movement led by Slobodan Milosevic wanted to restore
and impose by force on all non-Serbs in 1986 - is based on
the principles of territorial expansion and the political
domination of only one "chosen" nation - the Serbian
nation. The right "to bea chosen nation" and dominate
others is mainly based on the mythological consciousness
of the greatness, heroism and Piedrnonte-style sense of
mission of the Serb nation, which is surrounded by
allegedly upstart, genocidal, and, in every way inferior,
nations: Croats, Slovenes, Albanians, Macedonians and
Muslims. The Serbian idea of "Yugoslavhood" does not
know or recognise any form of federalism and
multiculturalism as a political value or constitutional
principle.
For Serbs, who (unlike Croats and Slovenes) did not
have the historical experience of living in complex state
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unions, "Yugoslavhood" always meant something else: the
territorial expansion of Serbia, the negation of differences,
the domination and negation of religious (that was the
purpose of militant atheism) and cultural differences. In
Serbian philosophy and realpolitik, federalism is not a
recognised positive value. The key slogan of communist
Yugoslavia, "brotherhood and unity" expressed this
concept of "Yugoslavhood", which did not recognise the
other two key slogans of the French revolution: the
freedom and equality of citizens and nations, as well.
The Real Causes of War
The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia after the
eighties were about the understanding of the fundamental
political and constitutional principles upon which the post-
communist "Yugoslavia" was to be based.
While Slovenia and Croatia aimed for freedom,
federalism, human rights, a multi-party system, and a
market economy, the movement that simultaneously
emerged in Serbia and the JNA leadership aimed for the
negation of these ideas and principles.
Nationalist and secessionist movements in Slovenia,
Croatia and Bosnia were therefore not the cause, as stated
by Warren Zimmermann, but the inevitable consequence
of the pan-Serbian National-Socialist and racist movement
which openly threatened to undermine all the federal and
democratic institutions (which were defective anyhow),
and forcibly prevent the emergence of a multi-party system
and private ownership, and promoted the racist negation
of all ethnic and cultural differences (racist rhetoric and
practice were initially directed against Albanians in
Kosovo, and were gradually expanded to include all non-
Serbian peoples).
The actual roots, causes and motives of the post-
communist wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia are to
be found in the Serbs, Serbia and the JNA. The National-
Socialist movement led by Slobodan Milosevic since 1986
had not wanted to accept either a true federalisation or
the democratic transformation of the SFRJ. The goal of
this movement was either total Serbian domination or
aggression. Some of the causes and reasons for this
aggression are also to be found in the JNA: all the elements
of the new political movements in Croatia and Slovenia
were absolutely unacceptable to the ideologically
xenophobic communist army. The demands for a multi-
party system, market economy and democratic federalism
were, for the JNA, the immediate reason for a coup or
war.
The causes and reasons for the wars in Slovenia,
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina do not, as Warren
Zimmerman believes and claims, lie in nationalism per
se, but in the specific forms of nationalism (National
Socialism) and totalitarianism which developed, both
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spontaneously and on an organised basis, in the leadership
of the JNA, and in Serbia in the mid-eighties.
Finally, by the time the multi-party system and the
first intimations of secessionist movements began to
emerge in Slovenia and Croatia (in the period between
1989 and 1990), the National Socialist movement in Serbia
had had some four or five years of destructive and racist
practice (Slobodan Milosevic had come to power in 1986).
At the time the new political elites and their parties
came to power in Slovenia and Croatia, the National-
Socialist movement in Serbia had already completed all
its preparations for overthrowing these elites, or waging
wars of aggression against these countries.
At the moment when people in Croatia and Slovenia
were just beginning to seriously ponder multi-party
elections and the overthrow of Communism in the fall of
1989, the various projects for the military overthrow and
aggression against Croatia and Slovenia were already
completed.
As Slavenka Drakulic put it: "The war is not difficult
to understand at all: There existed a Serbian political elite
determined to start a war; it controlled the army; it
controlled the media, and it had four years of systematic
nationalist propaganda behind it. This is all it takes to
start a war." (Los Angeles Times)
As a direct witness, and for a time, a participant in
these events, I can state that the Croatian Government
was aware of the above-noted preparations for aggression
on the part of the Yugoslav Army and Serbia.
Given that the mechanism of this aggressive and
imperialistic Greater-Serbian attitude could not be
changed, the Croatian Government tried to prevent
aggression by limiting the potential o~nic conflicts, then
by proposing a "confederation" designed to peacefully
transform the former Yugoslavia into a commonwealth
of sovereign south Slavic states.
The scholarly underpinnings of the confederation
agreement were completed by August of 1990, and were
drafted along the lines of the European Community prior
to the 1992 model, retaining: a customs and monetary
union, a confederate judiciary for human rights, and also
a defence organization for the confederation modeled
after NATO.
This proposal was offered for discussion and debate
to all the republics of the former Yugoslavia, but for
various reasons it did not obtain their support. The
proposal to peacefully transform the Yugoslav federation
into a commonwealth was also submitted to
representatives of the Bush administration (in the middle
of September of 1991), which did not receive their
diplomatic support either, but on the contrary, was
opposed by a stance in favor of the unity of the communist
Yugoslavia and the reformist government of Ante
Markovic. •
1 Bellah, R.N. and others (1985), Habits of the Heart. Berkeley: University of California Press.
2 Bellah, R.N. (1967) Civil Religion in America. Daedalus 96:1-21
3 I had the pleasure of meeting him several times: we dined together, three times, and we also took part in a VIP tennis tournament at
Rogla, Slovenia, in 1990, after which the Serb press accused us both of having conspired to break up Yugoslavia under the guise of playing
tennis.
4 In his book "Great Ideas and Little Nations" he presents an interesting thesis: neither communism nor fascism are specific to little
nations, but appear when their consciousness becomes possessed by, and wrapped up in, "great totalitarian ideas" (i.e. ideologies) that they
receive from a wider, European context.
